Insurance Product Design and Its Effects: Trade-Offs Along the Managed Care Continuum This paper uses 1996-97 Community Tracking Study data to analyze the effects of different insurance product designs on service use, access, and consumer assessments of care for nonelderly people with employer-sponsored insurance. Product types are defined by features including use of networks, gatekeeping, capitation, and group/staff model delivery systems. We found no evidence of differences across product types in unmet need or delayed care or use of hospitals, surgery, or emergency rooms. At the same time, different product designs present purchasers with a clear trade-off between paying more out of pocket and encountering more administrative barriers to care. In addition, an increasing proportion of consumers report dissatisfaction with choice of physicians and low trust in physicians as one moves along the managed care continuum from unmanaged to heavily managed products. Our findings have implications for efforts to regulate managed care. The existence of a trade-off between out-of-pocket costs and administrative barriers to care means that some forms of regulation run the risk of reducing choices available to consumers. This is particularly true of regulations that would change the nature of managed care products by prohibiting the use of specific care management tools. To the extent that the backlash against managed care targets restrictions on choice and administrative hassles among consumers who nonetheless choose more heavily managed products because of their lower cost, eliminating heavily managed products would leave those consumers worse off.
Health insurance products have undergone considerable change in recent decades in response to public and private purchasers' efforts to control costs and health plans' competitive response to those efforts. Purchasers have faced an increasingly varied set of choices of insurance products as health plans have incorporated features such as gatekeeping, utilization management, and provider financial incentives into their products.
Some of these features have raised concerns among some consumers and physicians. Reliance on gatekeeping has evoked worries about consumers' ability to select their own providers and gain access to them. Some have questioned whether capitation of providers and direct controls on utilization lead to stinting on care, with potential adverse impacts on quality. Pressure from consumers and physicians has led state and federal policymakers to consider, and many states to enact, legislation that would limit the use of some of these tools of managed care.
The policy debate often has been about ''managed care,'' without looking beyond the managed care label to understand the distinctions among managed care insurance products. Further, some of the tools of managed care have been adopted by indemnity insurers. The debate about managed care has gone on without empirical evidence as to how variations in the designs of insurance products affect the care that patients receive.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of different insurance product designs. Specifically, we analyze the effects of combinations of product features-including capitation, gatekeeping, and group/staff model delivery systems-on a wide range of measures of patients' service use, access to care, and assessments of their care. The nationally representative data used include information on insurance features that permit analysis of the effects of a variety of managed care products for nonelderly people with employer-sponsored insurance.
Previous Research
The many published studies of the effects of managed care vary greatly in the size and representativeness of their samples, as well as their ability to control for differences in enrollee populations (Miller and Luft 1994, 1997; Robinson 2000; Glied 2000) . The age of the data used in many studies-often dating back to the 1980slimits their applicability to today's variety of managed care products. Indeed, the vast majority of studies (including one of our own-see Tu 1999/2000) have been limited to dichotomous comparisons, most commonly health maintenance organizations (HMOs) vs. indemnity insurance.
Of the limited research that has gone beyond the simple HMO-indemnity dichotomy, Kao et al. (1998) and Conrad et al. (1998) examined the effects of physician payment methods on selected outcomes. Gordon, Rundall, and Parker (1998) , Safran, Tarlov, and Rogers (1994) and Safran et al. (2000) compared group and staff model HMOs to network or independent practice association (IPA) model HMOs. Mark and Mueller (1996) included preferred provider organization (PPO) products in their comparisons. Finally, our earlier research (Reschovsky, Kem-per and Tu 2000) compared four common product types-indemnity, PPO, point of service (POS), and HMOs as identified by health plans.
Framework
Insurance products can be thought of as lying along a continuum ranging from unmanaged to heavily managed, depending on the particular features of managed care that are present. The continuum reflects an important trade-off in insurance product design: provider care management tools and patient cost sharing are alternative approaches to limiting unnecessary service use (Grossman, St. Peter, and Kemper 1997) . At one extreme of the continuum, pure indemnity products rely solely on patient cost sharing to limit service use. At the other extreme, heavily managed HMO products rely on a variety of care management tools to limit unnecessary service use and costs, typically with small per-visit copayments.
A basic feature of all managed care products is the use of a network of providers. Beyond this, health plans use a variety of financial and administrative care management tools that are implemented through providers. Administrative limitations on access to providers, which include the use of primary care gatekeeping and restricting coverage to in-network services, are designed to improve coordination of care and limit unnecessary use of specialists and other services. Network formation and retention policies also can be used to promote quality and encourage efficient use of health care resources. Other administrative tools such as utilization management, physician profiling, and practice guidelines also are used widely to encourage physicians to use health care resources efficiently. Provider financial incentives, such as capitation and other risk-sharing arrangements, are intended additionally to control service use and costs. Finally, HMOs historically have established exclusive relationships with provider organizations, creating an opportunity to develop a culture and additional management tools to affect care delivery. Group and staff model HMOs are typical of these exclusive relationships-relationships that are far less common today than even 10 years ago.
Health plans combine the various design features into insurance products. Plans tend to use a relatively small number of distinct bundles of these features, for several reasons. First, reflecting the trade-off in design described earlier, more heavily managed products, which by our definition make greater use of administrative tools and risk sharing with providers, typically place less reliance on patient cost-sharing incentives. Second, some features logically work together. For example, if primary care physicians are paid some form of capitation, enrollees nearly always are required to sign up with a primary care physician as a gatekeeper if for no other reason than signing up determines who receives the capitation and is accountable for costs. Finally, features sometimes are bundled together as a result of organizational culture and history. Most notably, group/staff model HMOs have a culture that emphasizes primary care management and prevention, and a history of delivering care in clinics where a large number of physicians with different specialties see patients and oversee nonphysician practitioners who also provide primary care.
This analysis focuses on four important product features that are likely to affect service delivery and consumer assessments of care: 1) whether the product has a network of providers; 2) whether the product uses gatekeeping (i.e., restricts access to providers in some way); 3) whether the health plan capitates providers; and 4) whether care is provided through a group/ staff model delivery system.
Data and Methods
The analysis uses data from the Community Tracking Study (CTS) 1996-97 Household and Insurance Followback Surveys to estimate multivariate models that relate measures of service delivery and consumers' assessments of care to characteristics of their insurance, individual characteristics, and indicators of the market in which they live. The methods are based on those described by Reschovsky (1999 Reschovsky ( /2000b . The CTS tracks changes in the health care system through periodic surveys and site visits . The CTS surveys are conducted in 60 randomly selected markets and are designed so that both market-level and national estimates can be made. 1
Data
The CTS Household Survey contains extensive information about individuals' experiences with the health care system, as well as their sociodemographic characteristics, health status, and insurance coverage. Within each sampled household, the person identified as most knowledgeable about the family's health care was asked about many aspects of its insurance coverage and health care; this person also served as a proxy respondent for one randomly selected child. In addition, subjective questions concerning such topics as health status and satisfaction with health care were asked of each adult in the family. The household survey data contain information on 60,446 individuals in 32,732 families.
The CTS Insurance Followback Survey is a supplement to the household survey with the purpose of obtaining accurate information about the household survey respondents' private health insurance. The names of the private health insurance plans reported by the household survey respondents were used to identify respondents for the followback survey. 2 The followback survey respondents (mostly health plans) provided detailed information about the characteristics of the products that they offered (such as coverage for self-referrals and methods used to pay providers) and that information then was matched back to the household survey respondents.
The household and followback survey respondents provided sufficient information for 55% of the sample of people with private insurance in the household survey to be matched unambiguously with an insurance product. 3 Responses allowed an additional 20% of the privately insured sample to be linked with a small set of candidate products (typically two or three) even though there was not enough information to match them with a single product. A statistical matching procedure, which was based on the demographic and health insurance characteristics reported in the household survey, then was used to match each of those people with a single product chosen from among the candidate products. 4 The remaining 25% of the people with private insurance could not be matched to a product and had to be excluded from the final followback survey analysis sample. To address any potential bias that might result from their exclusion, a standard nonresponse adjustment based on demographic and health insurance characteristics was made to the weights from the household survey. 5 The final followback survey sample consisted of 28,585 nonelderly individuals with private insurance, representing 165 million privately insured people in the United States in the period 1996-97. After excluding people covered by individually purchased insurance or both public and private insurance, and excluding individuals covered by policies whose policyholder lives outside the household, the analysis sample is 25,560 individuals who represent 144 million people.
Model Specification
The objective of this analysis is to estimate the individual-level effects of insurance products with different features on service use, access to care, and consumer assessments of care, independent of other factors that also affect those outcomes. Therefore, a multivariate model was specified to include type of insurance and to control for differences among individuals and across local health care markets. The basic model took the form:
where for individual i, Y is the measure of service use, access, or consumer assessments that is of interest; I is a vector characterizing health insurance products; X is a vector of individual and family characteristics; M is a vector of dummy variables indicating the market in which the individual lives; ␣, ␤, and ␥ are estimated parameters; and ⑀ is a random error term. Insurance products. The vector characterizing insurance products (I) is constructed from the four key product features identified previously. Table 1 shows how plans typically bundle these features together into product types. Moving from left to right in the table, products become more heavily managed as more care management tools are added. PPO products are distinguished from indemnity insurance by the presence of a network. In addition to having a network, HMO products generally rely on some form of gatekeeping. Among products relying on gatekeeping, some use the unique group/staff model approach to delivering care, some capitate providers, and the rest pay providers on a discounted fee-for-service basis. The vector in the model consists of four of five dummy vari-ables indicating the product types defined in Table 1. The mutually exclusive types are defined hierarchically based on these product features in the following order:
Ⅺ ''Group/staff model HMOs'' if the product is identified as a group/staff model HMO by the health plan. Ⅺ ''HMOs that capitate'' if primary care physicians are capitated. This includes primary care capitation, full professional capitation, or global capitation. Ⅺ ''HMOs that pay fee-for-service'' if the product uses gatekeeping. 6 Gatekeeping is defined as having a requirement that enrollees sign up with a primary care physician, not covering in-network services for self-referrals, or not covering out-of-network services for self-referrals. Ⅺ ''PPOs'' if the product has a network. 7 Ⅺ Traditional ''indemnity'' insurance if it has none of these features.
The product labels given here are based on these features, not the label given the product by the health plan, which occasionally differed. For example, in a few cases health plans labeled a product an HMO but did not report gatekeeping, capitation, or a group/staff model design; hence, we classified the product as a PPO for the analysis. While we have categorized products based on features that we expected to have meaningful effects and that typically are bundled with other features, other categorizations of products, of course, are possible. We explored some of these. As indicated, some product features are natural substitutes or complements of other features. As a consequence, some features are too highly correlated with others to define further product distinctions. The type of cost sharing is an example of a feature that we did not include because of its high correlation with other features. 8 In other cases, we explored additional features but found that they produced insignificant or inconsistent results.
Specifically, we explored the effect of POS options by dividing HMOs that capitate and HMOs that pay fee-for-service each into those with and without POS options. (There were too few group/staff model products with POS options to treat them as a separate category.) We found few statistically significant effects of POS 
The ߜ indicates typical features of the product type. a Group/staff model HMOs, by virtue of the nature of their exclusive contracts with provider groups, are characterized as having networks of providers. b Group/staff model HMOs may or may not be capitated.
options for these two types of HMOs-only 10% were significant, slightly more than the 5% expected by chance. While low power may be partly responsible for the relatively small number of significant results, the results generally were not consistent with our expectations, nor were they the same for HMOs using fee-forservice payment and those using capitated payment. This absence of an effect of out-of-network coverage may occur because use of outof-network providers under POS options is too limited for effects to be observed-even though it is a popular option when enrollees purchase insurance (Wong and Smithen 1999; Forrest et al. 2001) . We also tested further differentiation of HMOs that capitate based on the type of capitation. Three types of capitation were used in the recategorization: primary care capitation, full professional capitation, and global capitation, which account, respectively, for 54%, 28%, and 18% of enrollees in HMOs that capitate. 9 We found no statistically significant effects among these types of capitation. 10 Control variables. The vector of control variables (X) is included to account for differences in the characteristics of people enrolled in the various types of health insurance products. These variables include health status (using the individual items of the SF-12 developed by Ware, Kosinski, and Keller 1995 for adults), income, gender, race, education, marital status, age, family size, preferences for risk, willingness to trade off cost for provider choice, whether the individual's family had a choice between an HMO and non-HMO product, and whether the policy was new to the individual over the past year (see Reschovsky 1999 Reschovsky /2000b ).
Dummy variables for the 60 CTS market areas (M) are included to control for market differences of all kinds. It should be noted that because market dummy variables are included, the coefficient of an insurance product type indicates its direct effect on Y at the individual level. It does not incorporate any indirect effects that operate at the market level, such as spillover effects from the use of managed care tools on delivery of care to people with other types of insurance products.
Dependent variables. The analysis examines individuals' use of several services during the previous year. These include the number of primary care and specialist physician and nonphysician practitioner visits, emergency room visits, hospital days, number of surgeries, and three preventive care measures: whether women over age 40 received a mammogram, whether smokers were advised during a doctor's visit to stop smoking, and whether adults received a flu shot (see Wong 1999/2000) .
Overall indicators of access to care are whether individuals report having had unmet need or delayed care during the previous year. Those reporting either were asked for the reasons, which were classified into two categories (not mutually exclusive): financial barriers (e.g., lack of coverage by their insurance, consumer worries about out-of-pocket cost) and administrative barriers (e.g., difficulties getting referrals, delays in getting an appointment, difficulty getting through by telephone, doctors or hospitals not accepting their insurance) (see Reschovsky 1999 Reschovsky /2000a .
Consumer assessment measures include satisfaction, rating of physician visits, and trust in physicians. Family respondents were asked about satisfaction with their family's health care overall (not their health plan), with their choice of primary care physicians, and with their choice of specialists. Individuals were asked to rate the thoroughness and carefulness of the examination and the treatment they received on their most recent physician visit. These ratings are analyzed separately for individuals whose last visit was to a primary care physician and those whose visit was to a specialist. Finally, patients' trust in physicians to put medical needs first is measured based on adult respondents' agreement or disagreement with the statement: ''I trust my doctor to put my medical needs above all other considerations when treating my medical problems.'' A similar approach was used to measure trust that physicians will refer to specialists when needed (see Lake 1999 Lake / 2000 .
Estimation
Most of the measures used as dependent variables are constructed as dichotomies. For these, logit was used to estimate the model. Several other measures are continuous (e.g., number of physician visits). Because these tend to have skewed distributions and are truncated at zero, we employ the standard two-part model for estimating service use. The probability of any use is estimated using logit, and the log of the quantity of use, conditioned on any use, is estimated using ordinary least squares (Duan 1983) .
For purposes of presentation, logit and regression results are converted to predictions for the five insurance product types. These predictions are standardized for differences in the people enrolled in each of the product types, such that each represents the full population with employer-sponsored private insurance. This approach allows us to present results in natural units (e.g., probabilities, number of visits) for a standardized enrollee population. 11 The hypothesis that all product types have equal effects was tested using Wald tests. T-tests of the equality of effects of all pairs of insurance types also were conducted. For the logits, significance tests were based on the significance of the underlying coefficients, 12 employing variances estimated using SUDAAN software (Shah, Barnwell, and Bieler 1996) -which accounts for the complex survey design in calculating variances. For the predictions from the two-part models, significance tests were based on variances estimated using a bootstrap methodology, which also accounts for the complex survey design. 13 To the extent that unmeasured characteristics associated with the choice of health insurance product also are associated with the dependent variable in question, coefficients on the product type variables could be subject to selection bias in either direction. Although it remains a possibility, we believe that the conclusions from this analysis are unlikely to be affected by selection bias for several reasons. First, while prior research on public programs has found selection bias, research on private insurance has not (Farley and Monheit 1985; Dowd et al. 1991) . Second, when we examined differences in measured characteristics, we found significant differences in socioeconomic characteristics and preferences, but no differences in physical health status and only slight differences in mental health status, which declined along the managed care continuum. Thus, stronger forms of managed care do not appear to be enrolling healthier individuals. Third, in our previous work, tests comparing HMO effects for people with and without a choice of HMOs and non-HMOs indicated that selection bias between HMOs and non-HMOs was not a serious problem (Reschovsky 1999 (Reschovsky /2000b . Fourth, 35% of individuals have limited ability to select a particular type of insurance because they do not have a choice of insurance through their current employer or their spouse and would have to change jobs to exercise a choice. Finally, risk of selection bias is reduced here by the extensive set of control variables included in the model.
Results

Insurance Product Features
The prevalence of the product types among nonelderly individuals with employer-sponsored insurance in 1996-97 is shown in Table 2 . PPOs and HMOs other than group/staff models dominate. Only 6% of enrollees were in group/staff model HMOs and 13% in indemnity products, making estimates for the product types at the extremes of the continuum less precise than those for the other types.
Two additional features are highly correlated with the five constructed product types. First, POS options (i.e., coverage of out-of-network services without a referral) are related to type of HMO as defined here. Half of enrollees in HMOs that pay fee-for-service have POS coverage, compared with only 22% of people in HMOs that capitate and 15% of people in group/ staff model HMOs. Second, the trade-off between using care management tools and using patient cost sharing in product design is quite apparent. In moving from indemnity insurance to group/staff HMOs, the use of deductibles and coinsurance, which typically indicates higher cost sharing, declines noticeably. They are replaced by copayments, which typically represent lower cost sharing.
Effects of Product Types
The five products differ little on a number of important measures, including use of hospitals, surgeries, and emergency rooms and reports of unmet need or delayed care. However, use of primary and specialty care, the types of barriers enrollees encounter in getting care, and patients' assessments of their care do differ significantly across the five types of insurance. A majority of measures exhibit either a positive or a negative relationship with increasing reliance on care management. This pattern of effects is consistent with the initial framework, which identified a rough continuum in product design from unmanaged care under traditional indemnity insurance, to PPOs, to HMOs that pay fee-for-service, to HMOs that capitate and to group/staff model HMOs. Service use. Table 3 contains the predicted service use for each of the five constructed types of insurance. 14 In the table, footnotes are used to aid in interpreting the results as follows: when the predictions for the five types of insurance do not differ significantly from each other, 15 then there are no footnotes. When differences are statistically significant: 1) the highest predicted value and other predicted values that do not differ statistically from the highest value are indicated by footnote a; 2) the lowest value and those that do not differ statistically from the lowest value are indicated by footnote b; 3) those in between have no footnote. 16 For example, in the first row of Table 3 , the predicted total number of visits from physician and nonphysician practitioners is highest in HMOs that capitate, so that reflects footnote a. The lowest predicted value is for traditional indemnity insurance, so it has footnote b. Because it does not differ significantly from the predicted number of visits under PPOs, the predicted value for PPOs also has footnote b. Because HMOs that pay fee-for-service and group/staff model HMOs differ significantly from the highest and lowest types of insurance, they have no footnote. Unless otherwise noted, differences across product types are discussed in the text only if the hypothesis that the effects are equal for the five types can be rejected at the .05 level.
The way primary and specialty care are used differs significantly across the five types of insurance (Table 3) . Overall, total physician and nonphysician practitioner visits increase modestly as one moves from indemnity products to group/staff model HMOs, with about 10% more visits in group/staff model HMOs than under indemnity insurance. However, the composition of visits differs. Specialist use is lowest under HMOs that capitate, which use an estimated 19% less specialist care than PPOs, which is the product type with the highest estimated number of visits to specialists. 17 Group/staff model HMOs have substantially more visits with nonphysician practitioners than any other product type-more than twice as many as PPOs, which have the lowest use of nonphysician practitioners.
These findings are consistent with differences in product design. An increase in the number of physician visits along the continuum of product types is consistent with a greater role for primary care physicians in care coordination, the need to visit a primary care physician to obtain referrals to see specialists, and lower cost sharing. The reduction in specialist use is consistent with emphasis on primary care and efforts to control costs by reducing unnecessary specialist use. Group/staff model HMOs' greater reliance on nonphysician practitioners flows from their unique clinic-based delivery system and their emphasis on primary care.
Consistent with their preventive care philosophy, group/staff model HMOs stand out from other forms of insurance as providing significantly more flu shots and advising a higher proportion of smokers to quit smoking (Table 3) . However, differences in rates of mammography screening across insurance types does not differ significantly.
There is no evidence of differences across the five types of insurance in use of three important costly services: hospitals, surgeries, and emergency rooms. There also are no significant differences in whether a person used the service or in the amount among those who used it (not shown). This suggests that, in order to stay competitive, all products have had to incorporate some tools to control use of expensive services. For example, competitive pressures have led fewer managed products to adopt utilization management tools developed by HMOs.
Access to care. Consistent with the limited differences in service use, patient reports of unmet need or delayed care do not differ significantly along the continuum of product types. When looking beyond the overall measures, however, the reasons for unmet need or delayed care differ strikingly along the continuum (Fig-Figure 1 . Reason for unmet need or delayed care (Ind. ‫؍‬ indemnity; FFS ‫؍‬ fee-forservice; Cap. ‫؍‬ capitated; G/S ‫؍‬ group/staff. a Indicates the highest value and others that do not differ from it at p ‫؍‬ .05. b Indicates the lowest value and others that do not differ from it at p ‫؍‬ .05.) ure 1). Administrative barriers increase monotonically as one moves along the continuum from traditional indemnity insurance to group/ staff model HMOs, and financial barriers decrease correspondingly. The decrease in financial barriers parallels a dramatic decline in families' reported annual out-of-pocket spending from $766 under indemnity insurance to $346 under group/staff model HMOs in roughly $100 increments (Figure 2) . These findings are consistent with differences in product designs along the continuum, as plans have made different trade-offs between patient cost sharing and administrative care management tools in their product designs.
Consumer assessments of care. While the percentage of people who are dissatisfied, give low ratings of care, or distrust physicians is generally quite low among people in all types of insurance, unfavorable assessments generally increase along the continuum from unmanaged to heavily managed products. Figure 3 depicts the extent of dissatisfaction with health care overall across the product types. The bottom portion of the bars indicates the percentage who are somewhat or very dissatisfied. Each bar includes those who are some-what satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, and dissatisfied, but excludes those who are very satisfied. Thus, each entire bar indicates the percentage of the population who do not report the highest level of satisfaction.
The percentage who are less than very satisfied with their health care is significantly greater for HMOs that capitate than for HMOs that pay fee-for-service, PPOs, and traditional indemnity insurance. (Differences in the percentage somewhat or very dissatisfied with their health care follow a similar pattern but are not statistically significant.)
The percentage less than very satisfied with the choice of primary care physicians increases substantially as one moves from least to most heavily managed products, and the corresponding percentage for choice of specialists also increases (with the exception of group/staff model HMOs) (Figure 4 ). The percentage somewhat or very dissatisfied with choice of physicians also differs significantly, following a generally similar pattern.
Patients' ratings of the thoroughness and carefulness of the examination and treatment on their last visit if it was to a primary care physician generally become less favorable along the managed care continuum, although the differences, while statistically significant, are not large ( Figure 5 ). Ratings of the last visit if it was to a specialist do not differ significantly across insurance types (not shown).
Patients' lack of trust that their usual physician (typically a primary care physician) will put medical needs first increases substantially along the managed care continuum ( Figure 6 ). This is true for the percentage expressing the least trust as well as the larger group that includes all but those expressing the highest level of trust. An even stronger relationship holds for patients' trust that physicians will refer to a specialist when needed, although indemnity insurance departs from a monotonic relationship.
Concern about access to specialty care may be one factor affecting consumer assessments. Such a concern is consistent with the findings of lower specialist use and less trust that physicians will refer when needed under more heavily managed products. The findings also suggest that primary care physicians are a focus of unfavorable consumer assessments under heavily managed care. Dissatisfaction with the choice of physicians applies not only to specialists but also to primary care physicians. Ratings of visits are lower absolutely for primary care physicians than for specialists for all types of insurance, and it is only the rating of primary care physician visits that gets worse as care is more heavily managed. And finally, lower assessments by patients in more heavily managed products of whether their physician would put their medical needs first refers to their usual physician, who is much more likely to be a primary care physician than a specialist.
Implications
We found no evidence of differences across the managed care continuum on several important dimensions: unmet need or delayed care, and use of hospitals, surgery, and emergency rooms. At the same time, different product designs present consumers with a trade-off on other dimensions: along the managed care continuum, there is a clear trade-off between paying more out of pocket and encountering more administrative barriers to care. In addition, an increasing proportion of consumers report dissatisfaction with Figure 5 . Thoroughness of examination less than excellent, primary care physician visits (Ind. ‫؍‬ indemnity; FFS ‫؍‬ fee-for-service; Cap. ‫؍‬ capitated; G/S ‫؍‬ group/staff. a Indicates the highest value and others that do not differ from it at p ‫؍‬ .05. b Indicates the lowest value and others that do not differ from it at p ‫؍‬ .05.) choice of physicians and low trust in physicians as one moves from unmanaged to heavily managed products. These findings have implications for research on managed care, offering consumers choice of insurance, and regulating managed care.
Research on Managed Care
Most researchers would argue that research on managed care should look beyond broad aggregates like ''all managed care'' or ''all HMOs,'' and the significant differences among product types in this study confirm that they are right. Our analysis also demonstrates, however, that doing so is not straightforward. The correlation among various product features is often quite high, making it difficult to attribute differences in service use, access or consumer assessments to particular features of insurance products. This high correlation, of course, is not by chance. Health plans use particular combinations of features in their product designs either because one feature works best with another (e.g., gatekeeping and capitation), or because features are alternative means to an end (e.g., patient cost sharing vs. care management tools). Our response to these correlations was to analyze the effects of bundles of product features and to be cautious about attributing an effect to a specific feature.
The way in which products are characterized does matter, however. Our earlier paper, for example, analyzed the four principal product types reported by health plans-indemnity, PPOs, and HMOs with and without POS options. For outcome measures that overlapped, we found very similar results for PPOs and indemnity products-consistent with the small differences between plan-reported product types and constructed product types for these two products. However, we generally found greater differences across the three HMO products analyzed here than between HMOs with and without POS options in the earlier study. This suggests that categorizing HMO products based on payment method and whether they use a group/staff model better differentiates among HMO products than the usual categorization based on out-ofnetwork coverage.
Future research characterizing insurance product designs is warranted. It would be useful to experiment with factor analysis to identify types of insurance, to improve measures of payment methods and other features of insurance, and to measure additional features that capture new product designs as managed care evolves.
Offering Choice
One outcome of the backlash against managed care is that employers and policymakers are focusing attention on options for offering employees more choice of insurance products (Trude and Ginsburg 2000) . While this is motivated partly by interest in controlling costs, another potential benefit would be improved assessments of health care because employees can choose the insurance they want. Just having choice will not ensure favorable assessments with all dimensions of patients' health care or insurance, however. Faced with the trade-off between higher out-of-pocket costs and more administrative barriers to care, consumers may choose low-cost, heavily managed products but still be unhappy with limitations on the choice of physicians and other nonfinancial barriers to care. If so, offering choice can be expected to do little to eliminate anti-managed care sentiments: quite rationally, employees simply may be choosing the less costly products despite their unhappiness with some features of the products when they try to access health care.
In any case, it is not clear how to interpret the differences across product types in patients' trust in their physicians as well as the smaller differences in satisfaction and ratings of visits, particularly in light of the absence of evidence of differences in unmet need and use of several costly services. On the one hand, consumer assessments may reflect real differences in quality not reflected in the other measures. On the other hand, consumers' responses may be a reaction to the tools of managed care-hassles associated with barriers to care such as narrower networks, gatekeeping, and utilization management-rather than to the actual care they receive. At the point when health care is accessed, frustration with nonfinancial barriers is likely to be greater than frustration with less concrete financial barriers. Or, consumers may be influenced by widely held popular views, largely based on anecdotes and press accounts, that HMOs provide inferior care (Blendon et al. 1998; Reschovsky and Hargraves 2000) . 18 Regulating Managed Care Our findings also have implications for efforts to regulate managed care in response to the apparent consumer backlash against managed care. The existence of a trade-off between out-ofpocket costs and administrative barriers to care means that some forms of regulation run the risk of reducing choices available to consumers. This is particularly true of regulations that would change the nature of managed care products by prohibiting the use of specific care management tools. For example, prohibiting capitation would eliminate the option of choosing HMOs that capitate-a choice that affords patients less satisfaction with care and trust in physicians, but lower out-of-pocket costs. To the extent that the backlash is against restrictions on choice and administrative hassles among consumers who nonetheless choose more heavily managed products because of their lower cost, eliminating that option would leave those consumers worse off.
Overly prescriptive legislation also may limit future insurance options by stifling innovation as health plans design new products that respond to consumer preferences while delivering cost-effective care. In the long run, many believe that it is innovation in information technology and care management that has the potential to improve care delivery and reduce cost.
Regulation of specific managed care practices also is risky because the effect of specific product features is difficult to determine. For example, we know from this study that HMOs that capitate have different effects than less managed products that do not capitate. But because capitation is used in combination with other managed care tools, it is difficult for any research to isolate the effect of this tool alone.
Other forms of regulation run less risk of eliminating low-cost options than those that would prohibit specific features of managed care. Consumer protection mechanisms like appeals processes and judicial review, for example, may improve quality, or at least provide consumers with confidence that they will be treated fairly, without precluding particular types of insurance. Such regulations could have important benefits to the extent that lower consumer assessments of care under more heavily managed products reflect either poorer quality of care or consumers' beliefs that care is of poorer quality.
In any case, some of the current backlash against managed care may diminish even without regulation as the market responds to consumers exercising their choice among existing products. The market trend has been toward ''managed care lite''-PPOs and HMOs that pay fee-for-service, have broad networks, and include POS options. Unless the economic downturn and premium increases lead employers and consumers to place more weight on costs, continued shifts away from heavily managed care can be expected to improve consumer assessments of care.
The Health Care System as a Whole
This discussion has focused on the implications of differences in effects across insurance products that are related to the extent of managed care. It also is important to point out that a small but important percentage of consumers, regardless of what type of insurance they have, give unfavorable assessments of care and report unmet needs. Thus, there are opportunities for improving care delivery under all forms of insurance. For some patients, frustration may be not with managed care, but with the difficulty of understanding and accessing increasingly complex medical treatments from a delivery system generally under pressure to reduce costs. In the heat of the consumer backlash against managed care and the pressure to regulate it, we should not lose sight of the challenge of delivering high quality, cost-effective care throughout the entire health care system, not just under managed care. The statistical matching procedure consisted of first using the sample of policies definitely matched to a single insurance product to estimate models that relate insurance characteristics from the followback survey to demographic and health insurance characteristics reported in the household survey. These models and the household survey data then were used to predict followback insurance characteristics for each household survey policy that was linked to more than one product. Finally, these predicted insurance characteristics for each policy were compared with the followback survey's reported characteristics for each of the candidate products to which the policy had been linked; a match was established between the policy and the one candidate product with reported characteristics that most closely matched the predicted characteristics. In earlier work, we compared results based on the full followback sample (including the statistically matched cases) with those based on only cases definitely matched to a single product. The results, which were very similar, reassured us that the statistical matching did not bias the results (see Reschovsky, Kemper, and Tu 2000) . 5 The weighting adjustment was based on models predicting the probability of followback survey response (i.e., a match to a product) as a function of household survey variables such as whether the employer offered more than one product, health insurance product characteristics (as reported by the household survey respondent), income, etc. The weighting adjustment was a function of the inverse of the predicted probability of a response from this model. In addition, the sample was post-stratified by whether there was any interruption in telephone service, age-sex categories, race-sex categories, education, and whether the household survey respondent reported having HMO insurance. Post-stratification adjustments to the weights were made until weighted distributions were within .1 percentage points of the original household survey distributions. In earlier work, we compared results of analyses of the effects of HMOs for the full household survey sample with those based on the followback sample, in both cases using information only from the household survey. The results were very similar, indicating that followback survey nonresponse does not cause bias (see Reschovsky, Kemper, and Tu 2000) . 6 Note that because HMOs that capitate and group/ staff model HMOs include all cases of capitation and salary payments, respectively, the remaining HMOs include only products that pay fee-for-service-hence the label. Usually this is discounted fee-for-service payment. 7 If a health plan reported that a product was an HMO, POS or PPO product, then it was assumed to have a network; otherwise, the plan was asked whether the product had a ''book, directory or list of doctors associated with'' it, and if so, it was classified as having a network. 8 Another reason that we did not include cost-sharing features is that they are imperfectly measured in the data. This is because they vary by the specific insurance contract with each employer, and hence vary within products as they were defined for the followback survey. 9 ''Primary care capitation'' refers to products that pay primary care physicians using capitation but do not include specialty or hospital services in those capitated payments. ''Full professional capitation'' refers to all products that include primary care physician and specialty services but not hospital services. ''Global capitation'' refers to products that include all three. 10 It should be noted, however, that in addition to low power, two data limitations could explain the absence of significant differences among types of capitation. First, these variables only measure the way health plans make payments, which is not necessarily the way physicians ultimately are paid. An intermediary organization might receive capitated payments from the health plan but in turn compensate physicians on a fee-for-service basis, perhaps with additional financial incentives or administrative mechanisms to limit use. Second, the capitation variables do not measure important financial incentives beyond the capitation payment itself (e.g., bonuses or withholds). 11 Predictions from regression models with logged dependent variables are adjusted by the ''smearing factor'' (Duan 1983) . It corrects for the fact that while the expectation of the error term in a regression with a logged dependent variable is zero, the expectation of the exponents of the error term is nonzero. 12 In the case of logit models, the significance of the coefficient does not directly translate into the significance of the difference in predicted probabilities. However, there is typically a close correspondence between the two.
Notes
13 Models were estimated and predictions made for 200 replicates drawn from the full sample. 14 The full regression results are available from the authors on request. 15 The null hypothesis is that the coefficients for the five product types are all equal. 16 Those without any footnote include those that: 1) differ significantly from both the highest and the lowest values, or 2) do not differ significantly from either the highest or lowest value. 17 Total visits, total physician visits, and nonphysician visits were estimated using the two-part model. The two-part model was extended to divide physician visits into primary care physician and specialist visits as follows. The probability that the last visit was to a specialist (the indicator of specialist use that was available) was estimated using a logit model. Predicted specialist visits then were estimated as the product of the predicted probability of any visit, predicted visits among those with a visit, the predicted probability that the last visit was to a specialist, and the smearing factor. 18 Reschovsky and Hargraves (2000) provide evidence suggesting that these stereotypes about HMOs may influence how people respond to survey questions about their health care. However, given that few people are likely to be aware of features such as capitation, this cannot explain all the differences we found among product types.
